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Introduction
Several years ago, the Talent Agencies Act I was an effective tool
for regulating unscrupulous agents and would-be agents, and the
Labor Commissioner was a rigorous enforcer of the law. In fact, as
recently as two to three years ago, the Act was interpreted and
enforced uniformly and strictly, and wreaked havoc on the personal
2
management profession.
However, citing budget cuts and other unspecified staffing
problems, the Labor Commissioner, apparently hoping that the
problem will simply go away, has left much of the enforcement and
interpretation of the Act up to the courts. 3 Superior Court judges do
not understand (or do not care to understand) the Act, and appellate
justices appear to be just as confused.

I
Labor Commission Cases
A.

Hurley v. Rockit Enterprises,Inc

Although in theory the Act is still designed to prevent gross
abuses, some of the greatest abuses (against the artists who have the
greatest need for the protection afforded by the Act) are left
unchallenged. One such instance occurred in Hurley v. Rockit
Enterprises,Inc.,4 which was filed on behalf of a rock band named
"Wild Boyz" on September 3, 1992. In the suit, the band claimed that
Rockit Enterprises, Inc. ("Rockit"), the band's manager, and Polaris
Records, Inc. ("Polaris"), the band's record label, 5 were guilty of
violating the Talent Agencies Act 6 by unlawfully booking the band
into several venues across the country without a requisite Agency
7
license.
1.

CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1989).

2. See generally Edwin F. McPherson, The Talent Agencies Act
Manager's Nightmare,L.A. LAW. (June 1994).

-

A Personal

3. Since the original preparation of this article, the Labor Commission, particularly
Miles Locker and Thomas Kerrigan, have taken a much more proactive role in connection
with the Act.
4. Labor Commissioner Case No. TAC 70-92 (1992).
5. Both companies were owned and operated by the same individuals.
6.

CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47.

7.

More specifically, the unlawful activities alleged were: (1) procuring, offering,

promising and/or attempting to procure employment for the band without a talent agency

license; (2) demanding unconscionable fees and compensation from the band for illegal
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Obviously, the allegations were very serious. The band members
felt that if they were not allowed to get out of their contracts, their
careers would be over. Although the Labor Commissioner might not
have been interested in the other allegations, because there was such
compelling evidence of improper booking, including compelling
testimony by the very employee at Rockit/Polaris who was hired to do
the booking, it was fairly clear that the contracts should and would be
declared void.

The case was tried before the Labor Commissioner in April and
May of 1993. Although there was no court reporter transcribing the
proceedings, the trial was audiotaped for the convenience (and
subsequent referral) of the Commissioner's representative. During the
trial and thereafter, emphasis was placed on the fact that, although
Polaris did not have any money to go forward with another record, no
other label would touch the band until it was free from all legal ties
with Polaris. It was also made clear that, unless the Commissioner
acted swiftly, the band would have no future in music.
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of the ultimate
disposition of the case to the band and the unequivocal existence of
improper booking, the Wild Boyz are still awaiting a decision more
than four years later. Meanwhile, despite their talent and the success
of their first record, they have been repeatedly turned down by other
record labels because of their deal with Polaris.

services; (3) exerting dominating and manipulative control over the band for the managers'
own self interests and financial gain without regard to the best interests of the band; (4)
acting in conflict of interest with the best interests of the band; (5) making false
representations to the band and/or concealing material information from the band; (6)
failing to maintain proper records; (7) misrepresenting to the band amounts of monies that
it would receive for certain projects; (8) telling certain members of the band that they
could further their careers if they were not associated with certain other members of the
band; (9) purporting to "fire" certain members of the band while knowing that they had no
legal authority to do so; (10) attempting to exclude certain members from band meetings;
(11) failing to communicate with the designated members of the band; (12)
misrepresenting record sales' numbers and refusing to provide proper accountings; (13)
threatening the band with "holding them up in court" if they complained about their
treatment; (14) demanding that the band members refrain from joining any unions; (15)
continuing to hold themselves out as the managers of the band after being terminated; (16)
refusing to disclose to the band the amount of commissions received; (17) refusing to
provide proper accountings of the expenses that were taken out of the band's earnings;
(18) hiring attorneys to represent the band who had ownership interests in both companies,
and were currently representing both companies; (19) forging the band members'
signatures on legal and other documents; and (20) stealing the band's equipment and
instruments, thereby precluding the band from earning any livelihood whatsoever.
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B.. Arsenio Hall v. X Management, Inc.

In Hall v. X Management, Inc.,8 the Commissioner became quite
active in evaluating, criticizing, and ultimately punishing very similar
activities of Arsenio Hall's personal manager, notwithstanding that
most of the acts complained of did not technically constitute violations
of the Talent Agencies Act.
In that case, X, which was a management company made up of
Eddie Murphy (who left the company prior to the suit), Robert Wachs
(Hall's attorney), and Mark Lipsky, allegedly negotiated for Hall to
serve as a guest host of a nightly talk show and to act in "Coming to
America" and other films. They also negotiated Hall's contract to host
the "Arsenio Hall Show," for which Wachs and Lipsky each received
$5,000 per week and credit as production executives, until Hall
discovered this, and they stopped receiving the payments. The
company also negotiated another film contract with Paramount, a $1.5
million contract with Coca-Cola, and a contract for Hall to host the
MTV Video Music Awards, most of which were apparently at Hall's
direction and with his full knowledge and consent, which the
Commissioner found to be irrelevant.
The Commissioner also found that the production executive
salary and the company's later insistence that it was to receive 50% of
all of the profits from the "Arsenio Hall Show" was deplorable, and
thus determined that this conduct constituted bad faith and
overreaching on the part of the management company.
The company argued that it did not "procure" employment for
Hall within the meaning of the Act because it did not initiate those
contacts with the studios. The Commissioner found that the company
did, in fact, initiate those contacts, but ruled nevertheless that "to
procure employment" means "either to secure employment or to
bring about employment or to cause employment to occur.... It
means to arrange employment. It means to negotiate for
employment." 9 This, of course, was consistent with years of Labor
Commission precedent. 10
8. Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 19-90 (1992).
9. Id.
10. See Kearney v. Singer, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. MP-429 AM-211-MC (1977) ("We
do not believe that an engagement is procured by opening or preliminary discussion alone.
Procurement implies an arrangement including the determination of the specifics pertaining
to the particular request for an artist's service. The intention of the respondent to actively
negotiate terms of specific proposed engagements... colors the intentions with regard to the

19971

TIME FOR A CHANGE

X Management had received a total of approximately $2.6 million
in commissions since the inception of the management agreement, but
only $2.15 million during the year prior to Hall's filing a Petition to
Determine Controversy. Because of the strict one year statute of
limitations in such proceedings, the Commissioner ruled that the
management agreement was void, ordered the disgorgement of $2.15
million from, X, to be paid to Hall, and held that, because the
management agreement was void ab initio, the arbitration clause in
the agreement could similarly not be enforced. 11
One might ask what the difference is between Hall's case and the
Wild Boyz case, and why the Labor Commissioner would devote so
much of its time to the former, and literally no time (post hearing) to
the latter. Other than the amount of publicity surrounding the cases
and the amount of money at stake, there appears to be no significant
differences. One might also ask who was in greater need of assistance
from the Labor Commissioner: Arsenio Hall, who made over $10
million during the offending year, or the Wild Boyz, who could not
even afford to sue their manager/record company in Superior Court.

II
Appellate Decisions
The appellate courts' handling of the Act has been confusing, at
best. Two cases have been decided in the last three years, which, on
their face, are entirely inconsistent. The first was Wachs v. Curry,12 in
which the California Court of Appeal indicated that the Act's
prohibition against the procurement of employment by an unlicensed
agent may only apply if such procurement was a "significant" part of
13
that individual's activities on behalf of the artist.
The second case, decided just two and a half years later by the
same Second District Court of Appeal, was Waisbren v. Peppercorn
Productions,Inc.,14 which essentially wrote off the Wachs decision as
"dictum," holding that the Act means what it says, i.e., any
entire agreement.")(emphasis added); Pryor v. Franklin, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 17
MP-114 (1982) ("The furthering of an offer constitutes a significant aspect of procurement
prohibited by law since procurement includes the entire process of reaching an agreement on
negotiated terms where the intended purpose is to market an artist's talents.")(emphasis
added).
11. Hall,Cal. Lab. Com. Case No. TAC 19-90.
12. 13 Cal. App. 4th 616 (1993).
13. Id. at 628.
14. 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995).
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15
procurement activity whatsoever is prohibited.

A.

Wachs v. Curry

In Wachs, the plaintiffs, Robert Wachs and X Management, Inc.
acted as personal managers for Arsenio Hall. While Hall's petition
was pending before the Labor Commissioner, Wachs and X
Management commenced a declaratory relief action in Superior Court
against the Labor Commissioner and other state officials, seeking a
declaration that the licensing provisions of the Act are
unconstitutional on their face and as applied, in that (1) no rational
basis exists for providing an exemption for recording contracts and not
other contracts; and (2) the provisions are unconstitutionally vague as
to precisely what activities are prohibited. The trial court granted the
Labor Commissioner's motion for16 summary judgment, holding that
the provisions were constitutional.
The court, after addressing certain procedural issues, discussed
the issue of whether the statute is constitutional on its face, i.e.,
whether "there is a rational basis for exempting from the licensing
requirement those who engage in procuring recording contracts but
17
not other kinds of contracts."
The court noted that the provision exempting the procurement of
recording contracts was added to the Act in 1982, with a "sunset
provision" of January 1, 1986.18 At that time, the California
Legislature created a committee called the California Entertainment
Commission, which was to study the Act and make any necessary
revisions thereto. 19 The Commission engaged in its study for two
years, after which it submitted its recommendations to the Legislature,
20
which adopted them almost verbatim.
A majority of the Entertainment Commission recommended that
the recording agreement exemption be retained in the Act, for the
following reasons:
A recording contract is an employment contract of a different nature
from those in common usage in the industry involving personal
15. Id. at 255.
16. 13 Cal. App. 4th at 621.
17. Id. at 624.
18. 1982 Cal. Stat. 682, § 1, 2814; 1984 Cal. Stat. 553, § 1,2185.
19. 1982 Cal. Stat. 682, § 4,2816.
20. 1986 Cal. Stat. 488, 1804; see James M. O'Brien III, Comment, Regulation of
Attorneys Under California's Talent Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting
Artists, 80 CAL. L. REV. 471,493-95 (1992).
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services. The purpose of the contract is to produce a permanent and
repayable showcase of the talents of the artist. In the recording
industry, many successful artists retain personal managers to act as
their intermediaries, and negotiations for a recording contract are
commonly conducted by a personal manager, not a talent agent.
Personal managers frequently contribute financial support for the
living and business expenses of entertainers. They may act as a
conduit between the artist and the recording company, offering
suggestions about the use of the artist or the level of effort which the
recording company is expending on behalf of the artist .... 21
However, the problems of attempting to license or otherwise
regulate this activity arise from the ambiguities, intangibles and
imprecisions of the activity.
The majority of the Entertainment Commission concluded that
the industry would be best served by resolving these ambiguities on
the side of preserving the exemption of this activity from the
requirements of licensing. 22 The Entertainment Commission
recommended that the recording contract exemption become
permanent, and the recommendation was accepted by the
Legislature.23
The Wachs court went on to hold that the Entertainment
Commission Report "provides a sufficiently rational basis for the
exemption from the licensing requirement" to withstand Wachs'
24
constitutional challenge.
The court then discussed the second part of Wachs' challenge that
the phrase "occupation of procuring [employment]," as used in Labor
Code section 1700.4(a), does not sufficiently define the conduct that is
prohibited by the Act.25 The court noted that the standard Webster's
Dictionary definition of the term "occupation" is "the principal
business of one's life; a craft, trade, profession or other means of
26
earning a living."
The court also looked to the definition of a "talent agency"
contained in the Act itself: "A talent agency is hereby defined to be a

21. REPORT
OF THE
CALIFORNIA
ENTERTAINMENT
COMMISSION
13-14
(1985)[hereinafter REPORT]; Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 625-26.
22. REPORT, supra, note 21. It is difficult to reconcile this analysis with that
undertaken with respect to personal managers in the film and television industries.
23. 1986 Cal. Stat. 488, § 2, 1804.
24. 13 Cal. App. 4th at 626.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 627 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1560 (3d ed.
1981)).
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person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring,
offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists. Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel
27
or direct artists in the development of their professional careers."
The court noted the emphasis in the Act on "the occupation of
procuring," employment (with a sideline of counseling and directing
careers). 28 This is contrary to the Act's predecessor, the Artists'
Managers Act of 1943, which focused on the "occupation of advising,
counseling," etc., with procuring employment as the sideline.
The court held that the key word, "occupation," does not
encompass managers and other individuals whose "employment
procurement function" compared to his or her "counseling function,"
is not a significant portion of the individual's business as a whole. The
court noted that, "if counseling and directing the clients' careers
constitutes the significant part of the agent's business then he or she is
not subject to the licensing requirements of the Act.... 29
However, the court was careful to note that the key was the
nature of the business as a whole, as opposed to the specifics of the
individual's activity for that one client. In other words, as long as a
significant portion of one's business was devoted to counseling, as
opposed to procuring, it would not matter that one did not engage in
any counseling with respect to the one particular client. Similarly, as
long as a significant portion of one's overall business is procuring, just
one procurement would violate the Act, even if all other activity (for
that one client) was limited to counseling. 30 The court refused,
however, to set guidelines as to the meaning of the term "significant"
in this context.
Although Wachs challenged as unconstitutionally vague the term
"procure," the court summarily dismissed this attack, holding that, in
order to be unconstitutionally vague, a term must be "so patently
vague and so wholly devoid of objective meaning that it provides no
standard at all."3 1 The court noted that the term "procure" is used in
numerous California statutes, 32 and that the fact that none of these

27. Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 627 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE. § 1700.4 (WEST 1989)).
28. Id. at 628.
29. Id. at 627.
30. Id. at 628.
31. Id. at 629 (citing Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal. 3d 755, 765 (1985) (emphasis
in original)).
32. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 9997,9998.1 (West 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE §§
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statutes had ever been challenged "is some evidence the term is well
33
understood.
Of course, the court's determination that the term "procure" is
not "unconstitutionally vague" is not a determination that. the term is
not vague, at least as it is applied in this context. Notwithstanding
ample Labor Commission case authority, it is highly doubtful that
many (if any) personal managers understand that "procuring" means
anything other than actual solicitation of the employment, and that
they can be held liable under the Act for negotiating employment that
an agent or someone else actually sought out and secured. However,
based upon the Wachs court's holding that incidentalprocurement was
acceptable, the expansive definition of "procurement" is not a
significant problem.
B.

Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.

Wachs remained the law for approximately two and one half
years; as long as "procuring" was not a "significant" part of an
individual's business, there was no violation of the Act. For two and
one half years, managers could rest easy, knowing that they, could
carry on their day-to-day business without the risk of losing all of the
benefits of their agreements with their artists as a result of one
"procurement" indiscretion. In fact, the Labor Commissioner took the
position during that period that the relationship between the artist and
the manager must be "permeated and pervaded by employment
procurement activities ....34
However, in December of 1995, the Second District Court of
Appeal essentially overruled itself and purported to reinstate preWachs law. In Waisbren v. PeppercornProductions,Inc.,3 5 the plaintiff
had agreed to "promote" Peppercorn, which specialized in the design
and creation of puppets and produced various television projects. As
part of that promotion, Waisbren:
assisted in project development, managed certain business affairs,
1812.501, 1812.509 (West 1989); CAL. ELECr. CODE § 296.20 (West 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1540 (West 1989).
33. Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 629.
34. Church v. Brown, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 52-92 (decided May 12, 1994).
Procurement activities may include anything from calling a producer and asking her to put
your artist in her film, to answering the phone and having a producer ask you if he can put
your artist in his film, to negotiating the agreement between the producer and your artist, to
telling the producer that your artist likes a particular color jelly bean in his dressing room. See
McPherson, supra note 2.
35. 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995).
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supervised client relations and publicity, performed casting duties,
advised Peppercorn regarding the selection of artistic talent,
coordinated production, and handled office functions, such as the
hiring and firing of personnel. Occasionally, Waisbren procured
employment for Peppercorn, but hi 6 efforts in that regard were
incidental to his other responsibilities.

In return for such
services, Waisbren was to receive 15% of
37

Peppercorn's profits.

After Peppercorn terminated its relationship with Waisbren,
Waisbren commenced litigation against Peppercorn, alleging breach
of contract, among other causes of action. 38 Four years into the
lawsuit, Peppercorn filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming
that Waisbren, in procuring "employment" for Peppercorn, violated
the Talent Agencies Act. Waisbren admitted procurement activities
but maintained that those activities were "minimal and merely
incidental

to

his

other

responsibilities." 39

Nevertheless,

and

notwithstanding that Wachs had been decided 15 months earlier, the
trial court granted the motion and declared the agreement between
the parties void.4 °

The Court of Appeal, in affirming the decision, noted first that an

"artist," as that term is defined in the Labor Code, "includes a broad

spectrum of persons and entities working in the entertainment
field."'41 The court then held that "there is no dispute that defendants
42
qualify as 'artists' under the Act."
The court went on to describe the primary functions of personal
managers as advising and counseling the artist.43 The court noted that,
36. Id. at 250.
37. Id.
38. The author consulted in connection with that case.
39. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 251.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 252.
42. Id. at 252 n.5. The court recites the Labor Code definition of "artists" as:
actors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate stage and in the
production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical organizations,
directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, musical
directors, writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and
other artists and persons rendering professional services in motion picture,
theatrical, radio, television and other entertainment enterprises. CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1700.4(b) (emphasis in original).
The Labor Code further defines "person" as "any individual, company, society, firm,
partnership, association, corporation.., manager, or their agents or employees. Id. § 1700.
43. The court, citing O'Brien, supra note 20, stated an elaborate recitation of the general
functions of a personal manager, as opposed to a talent agent:
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although, "as a practical matter," personal managers "find themselves
in situations in which they would like to procure employment for their
clients," 4 4 this was not the issue before the court. The issue before the
court was whether the "occasional" procurer needs to be licensed,
which the court handily resolved in the affirmative.
The court first looked to the definition of the term "occupation."
The plaintiff argued, consistent with Wachs, that the dictionary
'45
definition of "occupation" is "the principal business of one's life,"
and that, in order to violate the Act, procuring employment for an
artist must be a person's principal responsibility. The Waisbren court
disagreed with this analysis, noting that one may have more than one
"occupation," and that the term is synonymous with "employment,"
46
which includes "temporary or occasional work or service for pay."
47
The court then went on to quote Buchwald v. Superior Court,
which indicated that the Act is a "remedial statute," to "correct abuses
that have long been recognized," and "enacted for the protection of
those seeking employment."48 The Act, then, according to the court,
"should be liberally construed to promote the general object sought to
be accomplished." In order to "ensure the personal, professional, and
financial welfare of artists, the Act strictly regulates a talent agent's

conduct. ,,49
In essence, 'the primary function of the personal manager is that of advising,
counseling, directing and coordinating the artist in the development of the artist's
career.' The manager's task encompasses matters of both business and personal
significance. As business advisors, they might attend to the artist's finances, and
they routinely organize the economic elements of the artist's personal and
creative life necessary to bring the client's product to fruition. The personal
manager frequently lends money to the neophyte artist, thereby speculating on a
return from the artist's anticipated future earnings. The manager also serves as a
liaison between the artist and other personal representatives, arranging their
interactions with, and transactions on behalf of, the artist. On a more personal
level, the manager often serves as the artist's confidant and alter ego.... By
orchestrating and monitoring the many aspects of the artist's personal and
business life, the personal manager gives the artist time to be an artist. That is,
managers liberate artists from burdensome yet essential business and logistical
concerns so that artists have the requisite freedom to discharge their artistic
function and to concentrate on their immediate creative task.... In this regard,
the personal manager is an indispensable element of an artist's career.
Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 252-53.
44. Id. at 253.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 254.
47. 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967).
48. Id. at 350-51.
49. Waisbren,41 Cal. App. 4th at 254.
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The court then reviewed certain Labor Commission decisions that
addressed the issue. 50 In particular, both Derek v. Callan51 and
Damon v. Emler52 specifically held that the Act is violated no matter
how "incidental" or negligible the procurement activities are. 53 The
court noted that "the construction of a statute by an agency charged
with its administration is entitled to great weight," and that, because
the Commissioner's interpretation in this instance was reasonable
(presumably, because it was consistent with the court's
54
interpretation), the court agreed with the Commissioner's analysis.
The court then looked to the California Entertainment
Commission's Report of 1985 for guidance. 55 The Entertainment
Commission was created by the California Legislature in 1982 in order
to "study the laws and practices of this state, the State of New York,
and other entertainment capitals of the United States relating to the
licensing of agents and representatives of artists in the entertainment
to recommend
industry in general.., so as to enable the Commission 56
to the Legislature a model bill regarding this licensing."
One of the most important functions of the Entertainment
Commission was to determine whether personal managers or anyone
other than a licensed talent agent should be allowed to procure
employment for an artist. The Entertainment Commission resolved
this issue with a resounding "no," maintaining that
[e]xceptions in the nature of incidental, occasional or infrequent
activities relating in any way to procuring employment for an artist
cannot be permitted; one either is, or is not, licensed as a talent
agent, and, if not so licensed, one cannot expect to engage, with
impunity, in any activity relating to the services which a talent agent
is licensed to render. There can be no 'sometimes' talent agent, just
as there can be no
5 7 'sometimes' professional in any other licensed
field of endeavor.

The Legislature then adopted all of the Commission's
recommendations.
The court then went on to discuss the Act's limited exception for
50. Although Labor Commission cases are not publicly reported, some cases are
accessible.
51. Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 18-80 (1982).
52. Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 36-79 (1982).
53. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 255.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 256-59. See also McPherson, supra,note 2.
56. Waisbren,41 Cal. App. 4th at 256.
57. REPORT, supra note 21, at 8-12; Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 258.
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unlicensed persons, i.e., when an unlicensed individual acts "in
conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency." 58
The court noted that such a provision would make no sense and would
be unnecessary if incidental or occasional procurement did not require
59
a license in the first place.
Finally, the court looked to prior judicial construction of the Act.
The first case that the court discussed was Buchwald v. Superior
61
Court,60 which did not address the "incidental procurement" issue.
The Waisbren court nevertheless indicated that the case was
persuasive because "it did hold generally that procurement efforts
require a license and that the substance of the parties' relationship,
62
not its form, is controlling."
The Waisbren court then addressed the Wachs case. The court
explained the two-pronged constitutional challenge that the plaintiffs
made to the Act, i.e., that the recording exception violated the equal
protection clause for non-music industry managers, and that the term
"procure" was sufficiently unconstitutionally vague as to violate due
63
process.
The court cited language in the Wachs case that "the only
question before us is whether the word 'procure' in the context of the
Act is so lacking in objective content that it provides no standard at all
by which to measure an agent's conduct." According to Waisbren,
because this constitutional test on the vagueness of the term
"procure" was clearly satisfied, everything else-including all of the
discussion in Wachs concerning the meaning of the term "occupation,"
and the Wachs requirement that the procurement activity be
"significant"-was dictum. 65 The Waisbren court declined to follow
58. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d) (West 1989). This provision, first enacted in 1982 as a
temporary measure, was made permanent as a result of the Commission's Report. See
REPORT, supra note 21, at 19; see also Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 259 n.14.
59. Of course, it is the court's analysis that makes no sense. If a personal manager's
procurement activities were more than "incidental," this provision would then be used to
allow the manager to work "in conjunction with" a licensed talent agent.
60. 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967).
61. Id. at 351.
62. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 259.
63. In fact, the plaintiff in the Wachs case suggested that the entire phrase "occupation of
procuring [employment]" was vague; however, the focus was on the term "procuring." See
Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 626-29.
64. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 260 (citing Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 628-29)
(emphasis added).
65. Id.
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this "dictum" because it is contrary to the Act's language and
66
purpose.
This, of course, is completely contrary to the Wachs court's
statement justifying its own decision:
We conclude from the Act's obvious purpose to protect artists
seeking employment and from its legislative history, the
"occupation" of procuring employment was intended to be
determined according to a standard that measures the significance of
the agent's employment procurement function compared to the
agent's counseling function taken as a whole. If the agent's
employment procurement function constitutes a significant part of
the agent's business as a whole thg9F he or she is subject to the
licensing requirement of the Act....
Finally, the court addressed the consequences or "sanctions" for
violations of the Act.68 For the answer to this issue, the court did not
have to look past Buchwald ("a contract between an unlicensed
[agent] and an artist is void") 69 and the Report ("the most effective
weapon for assuring compliance with the Act is the
power.., to... declare any contract entered into between the parties
void from the inception.") 70 However, conspicuously absent from the
Waisbren court's analysis and discussion is any indication from the
statute itself that such a remedy is proper. Moreover, as the judicial
and Labor Commission decisions aptly demonstrate, the significance
and meaning of the voiding of a personal management agreement is
anything but clear.
The penalties suggested and imposed in these cases vary
significantly. In some cases, the manager merely does not get paid a
commission for the offending procurement. 71 In others, the artist does
not have to pay any further commissions to the manager. 72 In still
others, the manager is actually disgorged of commissions previously
earned and collected, and not permitted to recover either the
66. Waisbren,41 Cal. App. 4th at 261.
67. Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 628.
68. 41 Cal. App. 4th at 262.
69. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 351; Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 361; see also
McPherson, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386 (1914).
70. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 17; Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 262.
71. See O'Bannon v. Nelson, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 1-81, SF MP 98; Bank of
America (Groucho Marx) v. Fleming, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. 1098 ASC, MP-432 (decided
January 6, 1982).
72. See Kearney v. Singer, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. MP-429, AM-211-MC (decided
December 1, 1977); Damon v. Emler, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 36-79, SF MP 63
(decided January 12, 1982).
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reasonable value of his services or any expenses that he advanced. 73 In
others, the manager is only disgorged of amounts that he made after
he became aware that a Talent Agency license was necessary. 74
Notwithstanding the analysis by the court and, on occasion, the
Labor Commissioner, the voiding of the personal management
agreement and disgorgement of all monies really does not make much
sense. The agreements themselves, as discussed by the courts,
generally contain provisions indicating, in no uncertain terms, that the
personal manager is not a talent or booking agent, and therefore will
not solicit employment for the artist. Whether or not that provision is
breached, the agreement itself does not contain any illegal terms, such
that the enforcement of the agreement would be a crime or other legal
violation.
Numerous agreements are breached every day without the
agreement being rendered unlawful and void. Moreover, there is no
particular mandate that, once the agreement is ruled void, there is
automatically no recovery on that agreement. In fact, the Labor
Commission, itself, has often held that an innocent violator (i.e., not
unsavory and otherwise qualified to obtain a Talent Agency license),
particularly when there is a sophisticated artist, can recover or keep at
least some monies under such an illegal agreement. 75
Even other violations of the Act are not punished by rendering
the agreement void. For example, if a licensed talent agent violated
the Act by failing to post his or her fee structure, he or she would, at
best, draw a fine or warning. Licensed agents violate the Act every day
by entering into oral agreements with their clients. Yet, even if those
agreements are held to be unenforceable (as they should be), and no
further monies are to be paid to the agent, monies are never disgorged
from the agent.

73. See generally Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 360; Rogers v. Portnoy, Cal. Lab.
Comm. Case No. SF MP 40 (decided March 8,1978); Pryor,Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC
17 MP-114; Sinnamon v. McKay, 142 Cal. App. 3d 847 (1983); Humes v. Margil Ventures, Inc,
Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 19-81, SF/MP 116 (decided April 15, 1982); Cummings v.
The Film Consortium, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 5-83.
74. See Nussbaum v. The Chicken's Company, Inc., Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 1780, SFMP 81 (consolidated with Case No. TAC 20-80, SFMP 84).
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bergman, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. MP 456, AMC 13-78
(decided January 9, 1980); Bank of America, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. 1095 ASC, MP-432;
Damon, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 36-79, SF MP 63.
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C. Shapiro-Lichtman v. DiSalle

In a Superior Court case, Shapiro-Lichtman, a talent agency, and
Mark Lichtman claimed
that Mark DiSalle, a writer/producer/director, owed the agency commissions for packaging a
76
film entitled "Kickboxer," starring Jean-Claude Van Damme.
DiSalle claimed that he (DiSalle) put the film together, including all
of the principal cast and the foreign distribution/financing. He further
claimed that the only thing that Lichtman did with respect to the film
was to obtain domestic distribution/financing when the original
financing fell out, for which Lichtman was to be paid 10% of the
$250,000 Producer's fee for the film,. The $25,000 commission had
already7 been paid and, according to DiSalle, nothing more was
owed.
Lichtman claimed that he was entitled to be paid 10% of all
monies received by DiSalle with respect to the film (and any and all
sequels), even before DiSalle made third party payouts, which totaled
approximately 67%. Under Lichtman's theory, he would have made
more on the film than DiSalle, who wrote, produced and directed the
film. The agreement between Lichtman and DiSalle was, of course,
oral.78
DiSalle claimed that once he had paid Lichtman the $25,000,
Lichtman threatened that, if DiSalle did not pay more commission, he
would tell the studio with which DiSalle was making another film
entitled "The Perfect Weapon," that DiSalle was a drug addict.
DiSalle therefore filed a cross-complaint against Lichtman for
79
intentional infliction of emotional distress and other related claims.
III
Prohibition Against Oral Agreements
Shapiro-Lichtman was particularly troublesome for several
reasons. First, DiSalle argued without success that an oral agency
agreement is unenforceable under California law. 80 Implied within
Section 1700.23 of the Labor Code is a requirement that agreements
between agents and clients be in writing. The section provides, in
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Shapiro-Lichtman v. DiSalle, L.A.S.C. Case No. BC 082 266 (1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pertinent part, as follows:
Every talent agency shall submit to the Labor Commissioner a form
or forms of contract to be utilized by such talent agency.... Each
such form of contract... shall contain an agreement by the talent
agency to refer any controversy between the artist and the talent
agency relating to the terms pf the contract to the Labor
Commissioner for adjustment .... 81
In Beverly v. Raymundo,8 2 the labor Commissioner enforced this
provision:
Moreover, the agreement entered into was never approved by the
Labor Commissioner as required by Labor Code Section 1700.23.
Further, contracts which violate the act are void.... Accordingly,
the Labor Commissioner finds that because the Respondents
attempted to operate under an agreement which was not first
approved by the Labor Commissioner, any recitations or covenants
therein contained which would otherwise entitle Respondents8 3 to
fees or commissions or any money whatsoever are null and void.
Although there is no express term in the labor code section
requiring a writing, the section would not make sense if such a writing
were not contemplated.8 4 Clearly, if the Legislature requires that "all
agreements" be submitted to the Labor Commissioner for its approval
as to form and contents, it goes without saying that an agent cannot
completely circumvent this requirement by entering into oral
agreements that do not contain the approved terms.
Moreover, the California Code of Regulations 85 discusses the
propriety of the use of oral agreements by talent agents, by a
prohibition against oral agreements that are not confirmed within 72
hours. The Code provides that:
No [talent agent] shall be entitled to recover a fee, commission or
compensation under an oral contract between an [agent] and an artist, unless, the particular employment for which such fee,
commission or compensation is sought to be charged, shall have
procured directly through the [talent agent] and shall have been
confirmed in writing within 72 hours thereafter. Said confirniation
may be denied within a reasonable time by the other party.... "
Moreover, the Labor Commissioner has interpreted the old
Section to mean exactly what it said. In International Creative

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West 1989).
82. Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. SF MP 41 (decided August 22, 1978).

81.

83. Id. at 6:5-19; see also Sinnamon, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 847.
84. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West 1989).
85. Formerly the California Administrative Code.
86.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 12002 (1989).
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Management v. Reynolds,8 7 the labor Commissioner specifically held
that, because the 72 hour follow-up writing was not sent to the artist,
the agreement was void. As discussed by the Commissioner:
It is clear from the Administrative regulation that before an [agent]
can recover a fee for his services in procuring employment for an
artist under an oral contract, he must confirm in writing within 72
hours, the employment found for the artist.... The letters that
alleged to be confirmations, did not contain the full terms of the oral
agreements, thus failing to fulfill88 the requirements set forth in the
California Administrative Code.

DiSalle, during the pendency of the case, commenced a
proceeding before the Labor Commissioner, claiming that these
sections precluded the enforcement of the alleged oral agreement and
that the Labor Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter. He then filed a motion to stay the action pending the
determination of the case by the Labor Commissioner. Such motions
had been routinely granted for years in both State and Federal
89
courts.
Judge Edward Ross denied the motion, ruling that, because
DiSalle was a producer, and the Code does not specifically mention
"producers" as falling under the definition of "artists," he had no
standing to assert a violation of the Code. 90 The court completely
ignored the fact that DiSalle also acted as the director of the film,
because Lichtman's counsel claimed that his client was not seeking
commissions for DiSalle's directorial work, despite allegations in a
verified complaint to the contrary. 91 The court also ignored the
portion of the definition of "artist" in the Act that says: "and other
artists and persons rendering professional services in motion
93
pictures," 92 of which a producer is certainly one.
The Labor Commissioner never even bothered to advise the
parties that, contrary to the provisions of the Act itself which provides
87. Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. LA220-CVW.
88. Id.; see also Professional Artists Management v. Peltz., Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No.
TAC 12-79, MP 475 (decided October 27, 1980) (holding that the artist's manager was owed
nothing because the oral agreement was not confirmed in writing within 72 hours); CloutmanMiller Agency, Inc. v. Botham, Cal. Lab. Comm. Case No. TAC 3-83.
89. Shapiro-Lichtman,L.A.S.C. Case No. BC 082266.
90. Id.
91. Id. This statement was completely contrary to Lichtman's own verified complaint, in
which he alleged that he was seeking commissions for all of DiSalle's work, including as a
producer and as a director.
92. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(b) (West 1989).
93. Shapiro-Lichtman,L.A.S.C. Case No. BC 082-266.
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for original jurisdiction with the Labor Commissioner, he would defer
to the Superior Court's wisdom. In fact, the Labor Commissioner
never bothered to do anything about the case other than simply to
ignore it and hope that the matter took care of itself.
In Shapiro-Lichtman, Judge Ross ultimately dismissed DiSalle's
cross-complaint on statute of limitations grounds, after denying an ex
parte application to continue the summary judgment hearing as
DiSalle was changing counsel. DiSalle was eventually forced to settle
the case with a stipulated judgment for $140,000, which was more than
10% of the monies received by DiSalle for writing, directing and
producing the film,94and more than 500% of the commission owed on
the producer's fee.

This case was an absolute travesty on several levels, from the
court denying the motion to stay, to the Labor Commissioner's
complete abandonment of the case, to the court's refusal to enforce
the Act, to the dismissal of the cross-complaint, and, finally, to the
ultimate settlement. If the Act exists to protect the artist, then it
hopelessly failed in this case, as did the system that was designed to
enforce it.
IV
Conclusion: Whom Does the Act Really Protect?
Why are licensed agents allowed to violate the Act with relative
impunity, while personal managers cannot negotiate one term of one
agreement for a baby band to perform at a bar for $20? It seems that
there is something inherently unfair about such a system, particularly
when a band that could only generate $20 for a night in a bar (or $200
or $2,000 for that matter) is almost invariably not going to be able to
attract the attention of a licensed booking agent, let alone get signed
by one.
The courts in the Wachs and the Waisbren cases, along with the
Labor Commissioner in countless Commission decisions, and the
Legislature itself, cite (as justification for some extremely harsh rules
and rulings) the intent of the Act, which is (ostensibly) solely and
unequivocally to protect the artist, and nothing more. Yet, who is the
Act really protecting if the manager of a band that cannot get an agent
will not (because he or she cannot) negotiate (or assist the band in
negotiating) a performance in a bar, or at a wedding, or at a party.
94. Id.
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And what about the talent agent at one of the big three agencies
in Los Angeles, who (recently), when one of their actress clients told
them that she now had an attorney and that she would like them to
negotiate her future deals in conjunction with that attorney,
responded, "we don't work with lawyers." Is it really the artist that is
being protected by the Act, or is it the agent?
What about an actor who does not have the clout of Tom Cruise
or Sylvester Stallone, or even Gary Cole or Jennifer Rubin? Tom
Cruise gets the Creative Artists Agency's full and complete attention
every time he sneezes; do other actors that are not of his stature?
Most agencies have many more clients than do the majority of
personal managers. Based upon shear numbers, agents do not have
the time to devote to each actor, to each opportunity, to each aspect of
a deal. So when the agent says, "I don't work with lawyers" or "I don't
work with managers," what is the actor to do, and how does the Act
protect him in that situation?
There are many fine actors in Los Angeles that cannot even get
an agent. Does the Act really protect them? And what about the
actors who lives outside of Los Angeles, where there is not such an
abundance of agents-does the Act protect them?
On the music side, although recording agreements are specifically
excluded from the Act and anyone can negotiate a recording
agreement without violating the Act, there has been much discussion
regarding whether or not an unlicensed individual (such as a personal
manager or a lawyer) can, without violating the Act, negotiate a
publishing agreement. The obvious answer is "no." Although some
argue that a publishing agreement is not an employment agreement, it
clearly is, as such an agreement requires an artist to write songs for the
publishing company and for nobody else for a specified term (not to
95
exceed 7 years in California).
Because "booking agents" generally never see the inside of a
publishing agreement, because their function is exclusively to book
performances, the artist is left literally with nobody who can legally
negotiate her publishing agreement. Once again, is the Act then
protecting the artist?
One might argue that, when you get to court, the Act definitely
protects the artist because, generally, the artist, whether or not he
needs protection will prevail if the manager was guilty of any
95.

See, e.g., Adams v. Irving Music, L.A.S.C. Case No. BC 090 519 (1990).
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procurement activities whatsoever. 96 Certainly, there are an
abundance of cases that support this argument. However, the Act, and
the decisions interpreting the Act, clearly have had and will continue
to have a chilling effect on what personal managers are willing to do
for their clients.
Clear too, is the fact that there is a myriad of unscrupulous
managers out there that take advantage of their artists every day.
However, the Act, perhaps because of the incredible and vast power
of the talent agent lobby, does very little if anything to protect the
artist from the unscrupulous agent. What
the
Act fails
to
acknowledge is that there are hundreds of professional, talented, and
extremely ethical managers out there who may very, well be in a
position to better protect their artists than an agent, and certainly in a
better position than the artist to protect him or herself. Many of these
managers belong to the Conference of Personal Managers, which is a
self-regulated group with a very strict code of conduct that is
vigorously enforced.
If an agent "does not work with lawyers" or "does not work with
personal managers," and a particular portion of a particular
agreement should be negotiated very carefully for an artist, who is
going to do that negotiation when the agent has a hundred other
clients? The artist? Who does the Act protect?
In light of the Commission's Report and Legislative history,
Waisbren appears to be the current law in California. However, the
Wachs rationale makes a lot more practical sense than Waisbren,97 in
that Waisbren completely ignores the practicalities of the
entertainment industry and, as a result, does not (as purportedly
intended by the Legislature) protect the artist.
If Waisbren is a correct statement of the law and an accurate
interpretation of the Act, then the Act needs to be amended. It is clear
that talent agencies should be regulated and licensed. It is also clear
that anyone who, as the predominant part of his or her business
"procures" (meaning actually soliciting) work for their clients, should
comply with the licensing requirements of the Act.
However, it is also clear that the definition of "procure" should
not be construed so broadly as to include negotiating the color of jelly

96. See McPherson, supra note 2.
97. Wachs is also consistent with New York law, which allows "incidental" booking by
personal managers. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 1996).
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beans in' a dressing room. It should be construed as the actual
solicitation of work, and not the negotiation of the deal. In addition,
"incidental" procurement should be allowed (particularly if the definition of procurement continues to include negotiation), as such
activities only help the artist; they do not hurt him. Certainly, if
necessary, the State could regulate incidental procurers with some
other type of license.
Finally, if none of the foregoing is adopted by the Legislature or
the courts, the penalty for "procurement" by an unlicensed individual
should be, at most, a forfeiture of only those commissions that would
otherwise be received for the particular employment that the
individual "procured." Any stronger penalty, in most instances, serves
as a windfall to an artist, who, generally, is well aware of the
procurement activity, endorses the activity when it suits his purpose
(and certainly does not turn down the part when solicited), and uses
the Act as a sword when, long after the fact, he realizes that he can
avoid paying commissions. It is truly.., time for a change.

